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The War in Ukraine as a Prelude to a Multipolar World

English Pages, 7. 6. 2025

Let me, more or less, continue my speech here several days ago. I discussed recent changes in the world and mentioned the Ukraine war as one of the most tragic, most inexcusable and most indefensible events of our time. My main point in this context is that it did not fall unexpectedly from the sky. It was a long time in the making and the world – the international institutions, governments, and all of us – failed to prevent it. This is my – probably debatable – starting point.

I have discussed Ukraine in my writings, speeches, and TV debates at least since 2014 almost constantly. I saw the developments there as a big problem more than 10 years ago. One of my speeches given in April 2015 at one of Prague universities was recently “rediscovered” by my political adversaries and published online without my consent as if it had been written last year. Many found it hard to believe that the text was ten years old. In it, I criticized Ukraine, not Russia, which is considered politically incorrect these days. Ten years ago, it was still quite normal because the post-communist developments in Ukraine – mainly the enormous size of corruption and the huge inefficiency of its government – were generally regarded as something unique. In this respect, Russia was in in a better shape.

Ukraine is a nation torn by internal divisions. I spoke repeatedly about it, about its persistent disunity, and especially about its limited willingness to do something about it throughout the 35 years since the collapse of communism. The events of 2014, known as the Maidan, revealed fatal internal divisions and discrepancies to anyone willing to see them. The international community did not analyze it correctly. Since Maidan, the West, and especially the U.S., has played only one card – Ukraine was seen as an instrument in its latent conflict with Russia. In this respect, I see Ukraine as a victim of these – in my eyes unnecessary – political maneuvers, which ultimately led to a bloody war.

I want to make myself clear. In my previous Hillsdale cruise speech, in June 2019, I was asked to speak about Russia (not about Ukraine) as someone who lived more than half of his life under the communist regime, who was considered an anti-communist and anti-Marxist then and who was, therefore, fired from the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences after the Soviet (and Warsaw Pact) invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. As someone who finally, after the fall of communism, got a chance to organize a fundamental political and economic transition of the country, then Czechoslovakia. I became the first Minister of Finance, then Prime Minister, and later President of the Czech Republic. It is assumed I should know and understand Russia, which is something I would never dare to say.

A similar communist experience with Russia and an understanding of communism are only two of the important factors that help us understand present-day Russia. I don’t claim to be an expert on Russian history or on Russia itself. During the communist era, it was not easy for me to travel, especially to the Soviet Union, and – in addition to it – people like me were not interested to go there. In fact, in my lifetime, I have been at least ten times more often to the U.S. than to Russia.

Nevertheless, after the fall of communism, I had to deal with Russian politicians from time to time and got to know some of them personally. Despite our painful experience with the Soviet Union during the communist era, we tried to establish normal, more or less standard, mutually advantageous bilateral relations between us and Russia. Not friendship, but normality. Six years ago, I said here: “I don’t demonize Russia and its President, I think we should respect that Russia has its own authentic national interests, which are, of course, much different from the interests of my country and yours.” This is a statement I don’t need to forget or apologize for.

The title of my speech here six years ago was “Today’s Russia: The Consequences of an Only Incompletely Realized Systemic Transformation”. Russia’s transformation from communism to a free capitalist system was only half-completed – although arguably more so than Ukraine’s. Ukraine has totally failed in its transformation task. Not because of Russia. Russia’s political and economic systems differ significantly from those in your country and mine. The same is true about Ukraine. Yet this does not explain the current war.

The war in Ukraine didn’t start on February 24, 2022. To discuss the war without paying attention to its history and prehistory is wrong and misleading. This war has very complex causes. I am not particularly interested in searching for arguments or documents about whether, in the 1990 talks during the German reunification process, the Western superpowers promised Russia that NATO would not move to Russian borders. Because this was only one of the problems. There are probably no written documents about it, but several key participants in these talks confirm that some assurances of that kind were indeed given. Whether or not such promises were made, I don’t know.

In the 1990s, as Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, I resolutely refused to discuss our NATO membership with Russia (but I have to confess that they have never tried). They accepted they had no chance to influence us and the other countries of Central Europe. Ukraine, however, was not Central Europe for us. In our eyes, it belonged politically, culturally and mentally to the East. I have always considered Ukraine to be Eastern Europe.

Something else was important. The world, or at least its main players, should have negotiated seriously before February 2022. It was necessary to look for a solution that would not lead to war already then. Russia should have done the same. Russia made a fundamental mistake. It could and should have been inventive enough to come up with a different strategy, not with a war. But it wasn’t.

The failure to start negotiating has been devastating – hundreds of thousands dead, the destruction of a whole country, significant collateral damages, including a fundamental change in international relations, especially in Europe, and particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. We in the Czech Republic feel it very strongly. As a consequence of the war, we have the highest number of Ukrainian refugees (and migrants) per capita in the world.

The war has changed the atmosphere in Europe, increased the power of unelected authorities in Brussels, and considerably weakened democracy and freedom on the continent. It has increased (or accelerated) the dedemocratization process in Europe and turned the EU into a preudodemocratic or postdemocratic entity. It is easier to say this so explicitly here, at sea, aboard this beautiful ship, a thousand kilometers from Brussels, but I have been openly saying the same for years all over Europe. The U.S. didn’t understand it for a very long time – to my great regret. Vice President Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025, however, suggests that some Americans are beginning to see things clearly and correctly. This is much needed.

I don’t dare to speculate about the future. I can imagine a temporary ceasefire, a fragile interruption of war, but I am not able to imagine the basis of a stable long-term solution. I cannot imagine a meaningfully structured financing of the reconstruction of Ukraine. Nor can I imagine how people in that region will live side by side again.

The war in Ukraine is not taking place in a vacuum. We all know that the world has been changing. We no longer live in the bipolar Cold War era world dominated by two powerful hegemons. Nor do we live in the unipolar world of U.S. hegemony, as it used to be the case in the quarter-century after the fall of the Soviet Union. We are moving toward a world of very unstable multipolarity. We are not there yet. We are somewhere in-between the two systems.

It seems to me that Ukraine war is just a prelude, an interim phase, in which positions are being formed. The old habits and styles of behavior still exist, but new ways of behavior are emerging. Multilateralism needs new strong players and the generally accepted rules of the game. China, India and some other BRICS countries already play a significant role, some other countries still hesitate or are not strong enough.

There is one missing link, which weakens today’s stage of multilateralism. This is the absence of the voice of Europe. Its former powers have lost their significance and the attempt to politically unify Europe has failed. The current European Union is not an authentic institution. It is an artificial entity, which does not truly represent the people living on the European continent. I intentionally do not say Europeans. The European identity is relatively weak.

I feel strongly that I am a Praguer, I am a Czech, I am a Central European, I am a Slav. The European identity is much weaker than that.

I may be a man of yesterday, but I don’t want to be a man of the brave new world of tomorrow. With our tragic communist experience, we fear the new coming of the world of Aldoux Huxley or George Orwell very strongly.

The victory of Donald Trump in the American presidential elections had shaken the world, opened many eyes and created an extraordinary opportunity which we are obliged to use. Such an opportunity does not come often. I am afraid – with my European experience – we can very easily miss it. Fortunately, there is Hillsdale. It will not let us forget what freedom means.

Václav Klaus, Hillsdale College Cruise, June 7, 2025